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THE PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY: POSTWAR AMERICAN ART 
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
JONATHAN LAHEY DRONSFIELD* 
I. 
Unless our point of departure be that democracy as it is practiced in and 
promoted by the United States of America is itself already an import, which of 
course is something we cannot exclude, then the question being raised in this 
journal, namely whether democracy “translates” across borders, presupposes 
that democracy begins, as democracy, this side of the border, that is in the 
United States. In which case, ought not the question more properly to be Does 
American democracy translate across America’s borders; can democracy as it 
is promoted by the United States cross its borders in a translatable form? Is 
American democracy translatable into an exportable form? 
It is the contention of this paper that when America seeks to export 
democracy, there is a return, a return of democracy, which can be seen as a 
return on democracy, a return of democracy such that it shows something 
about the democracy from where it comes, about the practices of politics in the 
demos of the United States, which would not otherwise be visible. If this is so, 
then democracy as it begins in the U.S., the democracy that is exported by the 
U.S. for translation to, in and into other sovereign states, is not something ‘in 
itself’; it is essentially and from the start yet to arrive in the very place whence 
it comes. This is not to say that democracy in the United States is somehow 
completed only when it is exported and translated across its borders, but that it 
is not the democracy it is until it has been thus translated. Even then, once 
translated, it cannot be said to have fully arrived, because this process, of the 
return of democracy as a return on democracy, is something that can never, in 
principle, come to an end. It is in this sense we can say that democracy is 
perfectible. It is to say, in short, that there is no origin to democracy, no 
‘original’ democracy to be translated. Democracy is always already in 
translation, and the concept bears witness to that experience of translation. 
 
* Forum for European Philosophy, London School of Economics; Institute for Doctoral Studies in 
the Visual Arts, Portland ME. My thanks go to Cinzia Cremona (University of the Arts London), 
Letitia Guran (North Carolina A&T State), and Sarah Wilson (Courtauld Institute) for their 
comments. 
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What must also be considered is that sending democracy as a translation 
across borders is at the same time to bring the border into question, not just the 
geographical or geo-political borders of democracy, but the border of the 
concept of democracy. If something about or of democracy returns (back) 
across the border in the manner outlined above, then the border of the concept 
of democracy has been displaced, and the process by which democracy is 
translated is one of displacement. Let us examine these hypotheses through the 
case of culture, what we might call the culture of democracy, specifically an art 
exhibition sent across the borders of the United States, to the external borders 
of democracy in Europe and Latin America shortly after the Second World 
War. 
II. 
In October 1946 the first touring art exhibition to be sponsored, organized, 
and funded directly by the U.S. State Department opened at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, New York City.1 It was a group of modern American 
paintings gathered to be sent to Latin America and Eastern Europe. The title –
Advancing American Art – implies that its being of American art is doubly 
genitival, an exhibition which advances American art, and an exhibition of 
advanced American art. We will see that the title at once reveals and covers 
over a tension internal to the exhibition that would prove fatal. 
Advancing American Art was put together in response to foreign 
governments requesting examples of modern American art, and entreaties from 
U.S. diplomatic agencies that America show itself to be not just 
technologically and economically advanced, but culturally so as well.2 This 
emerged out of a disquiet at the conservatism of ‘representative’ touring 
exhibitions and exchange programs hitherto, responsibility for which at the 
time fell to the National Gallery of Art and its Inter-American Office.3 The 
exhibition was also unusual, indeed unique, for the fact that its works were not 
borrowed from lenders, but purchased by the State Department, for financial 
and practical reasons, because the exhibition was projected to tour for five 
years.4 The job of selecting which works would be purchased and exhibited fell 
 
 1. Margaret Lynne Ausfeld, Circus Girl Arrested: A History of the Advancing American 
Art Collection, 1946-1948, in ADVANCING AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT EXHIBITION, 1946-1948, at 11, 11–14 (Montgomery Museum of Fine Arts 
ed., 1984). 
 2. Milton C. Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey, 
AMERICANS FOR THE ARTS 5 (June 26, 2009), http://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/ 
files/MCCpaper.pdf. 
 3. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 11, 14, 27. 
 4. See Dennis Harper, Advancing American Art: Leroy Davidson’s “Blind Date with 
Destiny,” in ART INTERRUPTED: ADVANCING AMERICAN ART AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL 
DIPLOMACY 8, 11 (2012). 
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to Joseph Leroy Davidson, former Assistant Director of The Walker Art 
Center, and then Art Specialist and director of international art programs for 
the newly established Office of Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC).5 
Davidson’s task, in which he sought the advice of heads of prestigious art 
institutions, was to stage a series of exhibitions that would establish that artists 
in the U.S. enjoyed creative freedom. 
Advancing American Art consisted of seventy-nine oils and seventy-three 
works in other paint media.6 The focus was on modern art, primarily 
abstraction, expressionism, and figurative expressionism. But there was very 
little formalism, “Davidson … overwhelmingly stressed paintings in which 
emotional or associative subject matter was expressed in abstract language, and 
he deemphasized works that explored purely formal … concerns.”7 
According to Davidson himself, the exhibition’s diverse influences 
included American folk art and cultures from Africa and the near and far East, 
as well as the expected European schools.8 Absent were the more mainstream 
and realist American Scene and Regionalist painters. With a single exception, 
all the artists were living, and comprised both emerging artists and well-
established names. Artists selected by the American Federation of Arts (AFA) 
for a forthcoming touring exhibition drawn from recent acquisitions by the 
Whitney and the Metropolitan museums were included, as were artists being 
shown concurrently in New York commercial galleries. 
Following its brief installation at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the 
exhibition split into two international touring shows. Thirty of the oil paintings 
were sent to Havana and Port-au-Prince, whilst forty-nine oils and around half 
the works in other paint media went to the Musée d’Art Moderne in Paris for 
the inaugural General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in November 1946.9 From Paris, the oil 
paintings progressed to Prague in March 1947, the first stop on a tour of 
Czechoslovakia that took in Brno and Bratislava. 
III. 
The Metropolitan show of Advancing American Art was critically well 
received, but popularly derided and politically condemned. The popular and 
 
 5. Id. at 8–9. 
 6. Id. at 9. 
 7. Virginia M. Mecklenburg, Advancing American Art: A Controversy of Style, in 
ADVANCING AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
EXHIBITION, 1946-1948, supra note 1, at 35, 52. 
 8. Mark Andrew White, One World: Advancing American Art, Modernism, and 
International Diplomacy, in ART INTERRUPTED: ADVANCING AMERICAN ART AND THE POLITICS 
OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 4, at 30, 31–32. 
 9. MICHAEL L. KRENN, FALL-OUT SHELTERS FOR THE HUMAN SPIRIT: AMERICAN ART 
AND THE COLD WAR 33 (2005). 
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political came together in the charge most frequently leveled at the exhibition 
according to Virginia Mecklenburg, author of a catalogue essay for a 1984 re-
staging of it: namely that it “failed to embody American democratic values.”10 
Yet this is precisely the basis upon which it was promoted by the State 
Department. In the words of William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs, “Only in a democracy where the full development of the 
individual is not only permitted but fostered could such an exhibition be 
assembled.”11 
The same claim regarding democracy is made by Mecklenburg in her 
catalogue essay. Davidson’s selections, she says, intimate that “the work of 
American artists and the culture it reflected embodied the ultimate democratic 
values – independence, concern for one’s fellow man, and absolute freedom to 
express individual as well as national concerns.”12 
Critics at the time agreed that the exhibition was primarily an expression of 
the freedom of the individual. Thus Ralph Pearson, in Art Digest, argued of the 
exhibition that it was of “the age of the individual in art.”13 And, Hugo 
Weisgall, in his introduction to the 1947 Prague catalogue, claimed, “As the 
idea of America has subordinated the concept of racial origins, so the growing 
international fabric of culture has subordinated nationality in art to the [poetics 
of the] individual.”14 
In Paris, the exhibition was also met with critical praise,15 and requests 
were made through diplomatic circles for the works to be shown in Poland and 
Hungary.16 The State Department commented that the show had “corrected” 
the widely held view in France that “American art lacked progressive force.”17 
In Prague, the Czechoslovak government funded the printing of brochures 
in Czechoslovakian, the President and his wife prolonged a courtesy visit into a 
gallery tour, and Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister in the Czechoslovak 
government, opened the exhibition. It was reported to Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall that President Beneš “welcomed the program as evidence 
of U.S. interest in closer cooperation with Europe.”18 The Prague show was 
well received in the extreme, and drew unprecedented numbers of visitors. 
 
 10. Mecklenberg, supra note 7, at 41. 
 11. KRENN, supra note 9, at 27. 
 12. Mecklenberg, supra note 7, at 57. 
 13. GREG BARNHISEL, COLD WAR MODERNISTS: ART, LITERATURE, AND AMERICAN 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 60 (2015). 
 14. HUGO WEISGALL, ADVANCING AMERICAN ART *12 (1947); BARNHISEL, supra note 13, 
at 269 n.12 (pointing out that these sentences appear in Alfred Frankfurter, American Art Abroad: 
The State Department’s Collection, ART NEWS, October 1946). 
 15. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 17. 
 16. KRENN, supra note 9, at 33–34. 
 17. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 60. 
 18. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 17. 
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At the time that Advancing American Art showed there, Czechoslovakia 
was not part of the Soviet bloc. An exhibition of Soviet art, Pictures of USSR 
National Artists, was “brought hurriedly from Vienna” according to the U.S. 
Embassy in Prague, yet compared unfavorably with the American exhibition.19 
According to Margaret Lynne Ausfeld’s history of Advancing American Art, 
the Czech newspaper Lidova Demokracie commented, “The [Soviet] 
exhibition is above all an event of political significance …. the exhibited works 
are more remarkable for their physical size than for artistic value.”20 
IV. 
However, in the same month Advancing American Art moved to Paris, the 
American Artists Professional League (AAPL) made an official complaint 
about the exhibition to then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, on the grounds 
that it was, “strongly marked with the radicalism of the new trends of 
European art. This is not indigenous to our soil.”21 
At the same time, a counter reaction against Advancing American Art was 
taking place in the popular press. The various media outlets of William 
Randolph Hearst, a Republican and avowedly anti-communist, conducted a 
campaign against Advancing American Art, placing full-page articles decrying 
State Department support, and deriding modern art in general and Advancing 
American Art in particular.22 As the exhibition moved to Prague, and the 
Republican Party made sweeping gains in mid-term elections, Republican 
senators spoke out about the exhibition. Senator George A. Dondero went so 
far as to say that “all modern art is communistic”23; that “Leger and Duchamp 
are now in the United States to aid in the destruction of standards and our 
traditions”;24 that American museums have been “infiltrated by a cultural fifth 
column”;25 and that modern art was “communism under the guise of cultural 
 
 19. KRENN, supra note 9, at 35. 
 20. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 17. 
 21. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 17; BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 61; KRENN, supra note 9, at 
36. 
 22. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 19. Reproduction of these notices can be found in ADVANCING 
AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXHIBITION, 1946-
1948. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 18, 21, 22. 
 23. FRANCES STONOR SAUNDERS: THE CULTURAL COLD WAR; THE CIA AND THE WORLD 
OF ARTS AND LETTERS 253 (The New Press 2000) (1999). 
 24. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 62. 
 25. KRENN, supra note 9, at 98–99. One wonders what the artist Karl Zerbe thought of this. 
After all, he had heard it all before: Kulturbolschewismus! Zerbe had a painting, Clown and Ass, 
included in Advancing American Art. ADVANCING AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 
IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXHIBITION, supra note 1, at 82. He also had his work Herbstgarten 
(1929) shown in the Degenerate Art [Entartete Kunst] Exhibition in Munich in 1937. Karl Zerbe, 
WEIMAR (Jun. 26, 2010), http://weimarart.blogspot.com/2010/06/karl-zerbe.html. First it was 
taken from the National-Galerie in Berlin and confiscated by the Nazis, and immediately after its 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
308 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:303 
freedom.”26 Dondero would go on to receive a ‘gold medal’ from the AAPL in 
1957 “for his congressional exposure of Communism in art.”27 
Such was the scorn and disapprobation with which Advancing American 
Art was met in Congress and in the popular press that in May 1947 a decision 
was taken by Secretary of State Marshall to close the exhibition down, 
curtailing its tour. On 5 May Congress voted to cut off funds for the arts 
program.28 In turn, demonstrations took place in the U.S. protesting the forced 
closure of Advancing American Art, and leading cultural institutions rejected 
the premises of the argument for shutting down the show.29 To no avail; on 11 
June Secretary Marshall officially ordered that the works in Advancing 
American Art be returned to the U.S. The ‘art specialist’ position in the State 
Department held by Davidson, the exhibition’s curator, was abolished. In late 
1947 it was ordered that the works of art be sold off, and in the meantime 
stored. 
That same year, 1947, would see the setting up of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), including the Propaganda Assets Inventory, and the National 
Security Council (NSC) which, in a series of secret directives, stressed the 
need to counteract “Soviet-inspired activities” with “covert psychological 
operations”.30 In January 1948, a major bill, the Smith–Mundt Act, was 
enacted with the objective of funding overseas cultural activities, knowledge 
exchange, and “interchange of developments in the field of education, the arts, 
and sciences.”31 However, the emphasis was on doing so “to the maximum 
extent practicable” through private agencies, “including existing American 
press, publishing, radio, motion picture, and other agencies, through 
contractual arrangements or otherwise.”32 
In February 1948, less than one year after the opening of Advancing 
American Art in Prague, the Czech coup d'état took place, in which the Soviet-
backed Communist Party assumed control of the country; and a few days after 
that, in March 1948, Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister who had welcomed 
 
showing in Degenerate Art it was destroyed, by which time Zerbe had already fled Nazi Germany 
for the United States. WEIMAR, supra. 
 26. KRENN, supra note 9, at 99. 
 27. SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 453 n.1. 
 28. CAROLINE LEVINE, PROVOKING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE NEED THE ARTS 88 (2007). 
 29. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 64–65. 
 30. Memorandum from the Exec. Sec’y to the Members of the Nat’l Sec. Council (Dec. 9, 
1947), https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-4.htm; SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 39. 
 31. U.S. Information and Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt) Act of 1948, 22 U.S.C. § 
1431(2) (2012) (repealed 1961). 
 32. 22 U.S.C. § 1437. 
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Advancing American Art to Prague, was found dead under suspicious 
circumstances, and later declared to have been unlawfully killed.33 
In May 1948, 117 paintings from Advancing American Art were once 
again placed on show in New York City, this time at the Whitney Museum for 
American Art, as a prelude to their disposal by auction through the War Assets 
Administration. In June 1948, all the works from the Advancing American Art 
exhibition were auctioned off, very many at a massive discount on their market 
worth.34 
V. 
Advancing American Art arrived in Eastern Europe, at the eastern-most 
borders of democracy, at a most propitious but fragile and precarious moment, 
the all-too brief chance and risk of democracy between war and cold war 
peace. For a while it increased the chances of democracy in a country which 
would, a little under a year, later embrace and be embraced by the external 
borders of state communism, resulting in what Étienne Balibar, in his paper on 
the ‘export’ of communism by Europe (and the “very idea of Europe” directly 
depends on the place of communism in the history of political thought for 
Balibar), calls, “the institution of impassable borders … a society of closure 
 
 33. ADVANCING AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
EXHIBITION, 1946-1948, supra note 1, at 86; Pavla Horáková, Anniversary of Communist 
Takeover in February 1948, RADIO PRAHA (Feb. 26, 2002), http://www.radio.cz/en/section/cur 
raffrs/anniversary-of-communist-takeover-in-february-1948; Rob Cameron, Police Close Case on 
1948 Death of Jan Masaryk - Murder, not Suicide, RADIO PRAHA (Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.ra 
dio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/police-close-case-on-1948-death-of-jan-masaryk-murder-not-suicide. 
 34. ADVANCING AMERICAN ART: POLITICS AND AESTHETICS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
EXHIBITION, 1946-1948, supra note 1, at 89. Shortly after these events, an even greater 
entwinement of U.S. foreign policy and private patronage of the arts ensued. In 1950 the CIA’s 
International Organizations Division (IOD) of its Office of Policy Coordination was set up under 
Tom Braden, who was executive secretary of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York 
in 1949. See generally SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 95, 97. Also in 1950, the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF) was established, covertly funded by secret CIA funds through the 
Farfield Foundation; the CCF contracted MoMA to organize and curate CCF-sponsored 
exhibitions. See generally SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 81–82, 86, 88, 134–38. At the time, 
Nelson Rockefeller was president of MoMA. SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 257. Ten years earlier, 
Rockefeller was appointed by President Roosevelt to the new position of Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs (CIAA) in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). 
SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 260. William Paley, president of CBS broadcasting and a founding 
father of the CIA, and Julius Fleischmann, president of the CIA’s Farfield Foundation, both sat on 
the board of MoMA’s International Program. See generally SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 262–63, 
273. John Hay Whitney, who had served in the CIA’s wartime predecessor, the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), succeeded Rockefeller as chairman of MoMA. SAUNDERS, supra note 
23, at 261. For a comprehensive history of this time, see generally HIDDEN HANDS: A DIFFERENT 
HISTORY OF MODERNISM (Fulmar Television & Film, 1995). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
310 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:303 
and fetishism of boundaries, a society of border guards.”35(Whereas Europe “is 
no longer able to exist as a closed unity,” says Balibar, precisely because it has 
exported communism). 
Consider for a moment how and why Advancing American Art arrived at 
that border. It was delivered first to, and sent on from, the inaugural General 
Conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1946. Set up immediately after the Second 
World War, UNESCO was before anything else, committed to the importance 
of culture in establishing and promoting peace.36 It was a successor to the 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation – a laudable body which 
was comprised of philosophers and scientists, as well as great artists.37 It 
understood its purpose to be to open up those countries which had become, or 
had been until recently, anti-democratic to the culture of those countries which 
were democratic; or in other words to open up such countries to the culture of 
democracy.38 As was affirmed at the time by Julian Huxley, UNESCO’s first 
Director-General, the culture of democracy is premised on the equality of the 
individual with the state.39 The export and translation of the culture of 
democracy was a fundamental aim of UNESCO from its inception. At its first 
 
 35. ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, WE THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE: REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CITIZENSHIP 87–88 (James Swenson trans., Princeton University Press 2004) (2001). 
 36. Introducing UNESCO, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION, http://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 37. International Committee on Intellectual on Intellectual Cooperation, UNITED NATIONS 
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, http://atom.archives.unesco.org/in 
ternational-committee-on-intellectual-cooperation (last updated May 11, 2011). 
 38. Democracy, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/democracy/ 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016). It is often assumed, not least by UNESCO itself, that UNESCO is 
founded on democratic principles. For instance, in a text detailing UNESCO’s purpose and 
philosophy, a document placing great emphasis on its commitment to the “democratic principle of 
the dignity of men,” Julian Huxley, the first Director-General, states that “by its Constitution 
UNESCO is committed” to democratic principles. JULIAN HUXLEY, UNESCO: ITS PURPOSE AND 
ITS PHILOSOPHY 16 (1946). However, UNESCO’s Constitution does not state this explicitly. 
Democratic principles are not cited as being those upon which UNESCO is founded. UNESCO’s 
Constitution states that it was set up in response to a war “made possible” by the denial of these 
principles. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
in UNESCO, BASIC TEXTS 5 (2014) (highlighting the only mention of democracy, and its 
principles, in the UNESCO Constitution) (“The Governments of the States Parties to this 
Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare: . . . That the great and terrible war which has now 
ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality 
and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and 
prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races.”). 
 39. HUXLEY, supra note 38, at 7 (“Nor, with its stress on democracy and the principles of 
human dignity, equality and mutual respect, can it adopt the view that the State is a higher or 
more important end than the individual . . .”). 
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Executive Board meeting in Paris in November 1946, among a handful of non-
technical and administrative matters discussed was this: 
Item 8, (c), Ex-enemy countries 
The Board requested the Director-General to present a report at the next 
session on the opening-up of ex-enemy countries to the educational and 
cultural influences of democratic countries.40 
Advancing American Art advanced modern American art, the exhibition was of 
advanced American art. The exhibition arrived in Eastern Europe, specifically 
those countries bordering the Soviet Union, at the border of democracy, 
bearing conferral of full democratic legitimacy by UNESCO, with the aim of 
opening up a state, or rather preventing its closure, through the culture of 
democracy. It was a gesture of democratic solidarity towards a country in 
which democracy had only recently been re-established, and which was 
perceived by the U.S. to be particularly susceptible to communism. Yet the 
exhibition was closed down because it was ‘seen’ to be anti-democratic by the 
populace in whose name it was sent, and who had for the most part, of course, 
not seen the art at all, but had read about it from or heard it caricatured by 
representatives, unelected as well as elected, of the democratic process: 
newspapers and senators. A year later it could be said that Czechoslovakia, 
with the Czech coup by the communist party and the adoption of state 
communism, had taken its first step on the road toward becoming for the U.S. 
an “enemy” country. 
VI. 
On the one hand, then, Advancing American Art was lauded by the state for 
its being an expression of the democratic ideal of freedom, and on the other it 
was castigated by the state for being anti-democratic. An artist could practice 
the virtues of individual freedom, and at the same time be attacked for being 
subversive of it. The paintings were critically praised abroad for being 
advanced aesthetically, but because they were advanced abroad as American 
they were attacked at ‘home’ for being advanced in the aesthetic sense. What 
makes possible these seemingly paradoxical interpretations of one and the 
same artistic practice? It is something about democracy, and brings us to the 
question we seek to unfold here: in what way can it be said that democracy 
translates across borders. 
Following the shutting down of Advancing American Art, the protests 
against the notion that modernist art was ‘anti-democratic’ intensified. A 
statement jointly-authored by officials at the Museum of Modern Art, the 
Whitney Museum of American Art, and Boston’s Institute of Contemporary 
Arts in 1950 states, “We reject the assumption that art which is aesthetically an 
 
 40. UNESCO Res. 8(c), 1st Sess., (Nov. 26–Dec. 10, 1946). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
312 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:303 
innovation must somehow be socially or politically subversive, and therefore 
un-American.”41 
Robert Goldwater, editor of the AFA’s Magazine of Art, argued that 
“modern art is in [no] way subversive of democracy but [is] rather an 
expression of its freedom, and we believe that the Communists’ objection to it 
supports our position.”42 
These arguments proved to be influential in how the state came to alter the 
understanding of its role in relation to art and the way in which art embodied 
the freedom of the individual and, therefore, carried out a certain kind of work 
for the state in translating democracy.43 In an interview given in 1994 
articulating this change, and referring to the events after the closing down of 
Advancing American Art, through to the success of the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, Tom Braden, who headed up the CIA’s first 
covert operations division in 1950, explained why the U.S. government felt it 
important to promote U.S. culture as an expression of individual freedom: 
We wanted to unite all the people who were artists, who were writers, who 
were musicians, and all the people who follow those people, to demonstrate 
that the West and the United States was devoted to freedom of expression and 
to intellectual achievement, without any rigid barriers as to what you must 
write and what you must say and what you must do and what you must paint 
[Braden’s emphasis], which was what was going on in the Soviet Union.44 
Braden’s political sympathies were on the Democratic left. In order to promote 
freedom of individual expression, he was obliged to resist the likes of Senator 
Dondero on the Republican right. Not by debate in the chamber, but rather by 
undermining the popular mandate and the power of the populist vote, in short 
detaching kratos from the demos with which Dondero was able to seek to 
enforce his beliefs. Or in other words, a non-elected civil servant, through the 
use of illicit power, subverted the democratic process by which politician 
 
 41. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 65. 
 42. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 65. 
 43. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 66. Two touring exhibitions in the late 1950s proved to be 
pivotally important in establishing American abstract expressionist art at the forefront of artistic 
practice, at a time when a good many abstract expressionist artists were avowedly on the left: in 
1958 New American Painting at the Tate Gallery, London; and in 1959 the American National 
Exhibition in Moscow. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 86. New American Painting was ostensibly 
sponsored by Julius Fleischmann as a private individual, but in fact Fleischmann was president of 
Farfield Foundation, a secret conduit of CIA funds. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 155. The 1959 
exhibition was the first to be organized by the Embassy of the United States in Moscow, but 
could only go ahead after President Eisenhower intervened to overrule the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities (HUAC), when it alleged that more than half the artists featured had been 
involved in Communist organizations. BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 87. 
 44. SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 98. 
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Dondero found himself in a position to attempt to censor artists and 
incriminate them for their supposed political views. 
Frances Stonor Saunders, who carried out the interview in which Braden 
makes his remarks, calls this the “sublime paradox of American strategy in the 
cultural Cold War,” and puts it very well when she avers that, “in order to 
promote an acceptance of art produced in (and vaunted as the expression of) 
democracy, the democratic process itself had to be circumvented.”45 Or as 
Caroline Levine puts it, “the greatest obstacle to the making of an art that could 
glorify democracy was democracy itself.”46 
The paradox is perfectly well understood by Braden: “In order to 
encourage openness, we had to be secret.” If the CIA’s operations had been 
open and not secret, overt and not covert, then in a democratic society they 
would have been open to scrutiny and to testing by the vote. Braden was only 
too aware that to subject those operations to such a test would have meant that 
they would never have been allowed to be carried out. Referring to the attacks 
of Dondero that we have outlined above, Braden states: 
He [Dondero] put up a heck of a fight about painting, and he made it very 
difficult to get Congress to go along with some of the things we wanted to do – 
send art abroad, send symphonies abroad, publish magazines abroad, whatever. 
That’s one of the reasons why it had to be done covertly; it had to be covert 
because it would have been turned down if it had been put to a vote in a 
democracy. In order to encourage openness we had to be secret.47 
However, what we are talking about here is more than the “paradox of 
American strategy” (Saunders), or a “diplomatic strategy . . . deliberately 
paradoxical” (Levine). Adumbrated here is the very paradox of democracy: the 
necessity of using anti-democratic powers to protect democracy from what 
democracy makes possible: anti-democratic powers. It is what Jacques Derrida 
calls “the double bind of threat and chance” intrinsic to the idea of 
democracy.48 The double bind is not just the chance of a transformation for the 
better, but the fragility of a threat of the very worst. Democracy is constantly 
open to a threat against it which it itself makes possible. 
VII. 
If it is granted that freedom of the individual is an irreducible principle of 
democracy, if it is, and that freedom is the right of a citizen of a democratic 
country, and surely the U.S. is exemplary in this respect – then what Senator 
Dondero was calling for is a curtailing of that right, in the name of democracy. 
 
 45. See SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 257. 
 46. LEVINE, supra note 28, at 89. 
 47. See SAUNDERS, supra note 23, at 257. 
 48. JACQUES DERRIDA, ROGUES: TWO ESSAYS ON REASON 82 (Pascale-Anne Brault & 
Michael Naas trans., Stanford University Press 2005) (2003). 
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Dondero and his ilk saw the communistic threat to be such that it would end 
democracy; and in order to forestall that threat they sought to deny citizens 
their democratic rights by invoking a ‘power of the people’. Braden, no less 
committed to the value of freedom of the individual, saw populism to be a 
threat to democracy, and in order to forestall that threat and minimize it he 
used state power to undercut the democratic process. The conjunction of these 
two underminings of democracy is no less than the play of power that is 
intrinsic to the force of democracy. The force of democracy is such that no one 
power will overcome it. This is not to say that the force of democracy is 
something which it possesses and which it can utilize to put a stop to the 
powers that would undermine it. It is to say that the force of democracy 
emerges in the differential play and conflict of these powers. 
On his side, Dondero had what he would call the popular vote, the voice of 
the people, with which to curtail the rights of certain individuals, call them 
artists – and there is something tautologous about the idea that an individual 
may be a certain individual – in favor of the people [demos]. Braden 
aggregated to his side the state and its power [kratos]. With this power, he set a 
limit to the sovereignty of the people. We might say that this is a border 
internal to democracy, a forever contested border, a basic conflict at the heart 
of working democracy: popular sovereignty against the liberty of the 
individual. The state protects the latter whist answering to the former. 
However, ‘answering’ is not the same as ‘conceding’. That either ‘the people’ 
or ‘the state’ must become anti-democratic in order to protect democracy 
against the other is a constitutive paradox of democracy. 
The play and conflict of these powers is constant and irreducible in a 
democratic society, and is forever shifting according to the specificity of the 
situation. We might say that politics is the negotiation of the play where, if the 
field of play is level, that is democratic, the ‘least worse’ is favored. In the case 
we have been following, the least worse would be what? It would be the 
keeping open of a possibility of democracy, where the possibility is either 
something better than we have currently, where the better cannot be 
prefigured; or it is better than what is feared, and where the feared is all too 
easily prefigured to the extent that it is over-determined, and the better 
becomes the present state of affairs. Non-democracies are closed off from the 
former possibility, for what cannot be prefigured is other than what there is. It 
is to the other that non-democracies are closed. Anti-democracies are 
orientated to the same, to homogeneity, to the calculable, to the ‘better we 
know.’ A present state of affairs remaining closed off from the promise of 
something better is a stasis becoming the worse. In order to give the better a 
chance, a risk must be taken, a risk of opening up the present to what it does 
not know. 
Braden wagered on the side of art, and on the power of art to work open a 
space in which the better might be given a chance. Art is a keeping open of the 
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world in terms of its possibilities. Braden’s position affirms sending the 
‘advanced,’ Dondero’s the ‘popular’. Both reveal an understanding of equality. 
Braden’s presupposes equality, Dondero’s aims for it. Braden’s is committed 
to the view that sending ‘advanced’ art to other cultures, especially non-
democratic ones, is proof that the U.S. presumes those cultures to be America’s 
equals.49 Dondero is committed to the view that the only culture that can be 
shared equally is popular culture. Braden welcomed the opening up of debate, 
something which is only possible through the provocation of art, Dondero its 
closing down, by supposing that debate can only be won by experts and elites. 
Both sees the other’s position as a threat to democracy, and both will go as far 
as invoking anti-democratic measures in order to ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ 
democracy from that threat. 
In a fundamental sense, then, democracy calls for the anti-democratic 
gesture. If we agree with Derrida, when he says of democracy that it is “the 
only system, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has 
or assumes the right to criticize everything publicly,”50 then democracy itself 
must be included in that which can be put into question: the idea of democracy, 
its concept, its history, and its name. Including the idea of the constitutional 
paradigm and the absolute authority of the law. 
It is as if democracy is not democracy until it has opened itself to the 
possibility of its own negation, in favor of a transformation into another 
democracy, what Derrida calls a “democracy to come.”51 This is what Derrida 
means by ‘the double bind’ of the threat to democracy being the chance for 
democracy, “its chance and its fragility.”52 
VIII. 
The power of democracy is also its weakness. The power of the people can 
lead to a weakening and even negation of democracy. The example of 
Advancing American Art would suggest that art is strong enough to weaken 
democracy. Dondero was clearly convinced that art is powerful enough to 
disorder society to the extent that society’s ‘democratic values’ are lost, 
forgotten or even destroyed. And in benefitting from the democratic process to 
gain a popular mandate he would put a stop to such art. Or in other words, he 
 
 49. Compare the reception of ‘avant-garde’ music in the U.S. government-sponsored 
programs toured to Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East in the 1960s: “State Department 
officials thought it wise to send only popular music but also Chamber music to Africa because ‘it 
would prove to them that we consider them our cultural equals.’” Danielle Fosler-Lussier, 
American Cultural Diplomacy and the Mediation of Avant-Garde Music, in SOUND 
COMMITMENTS: AVANT-GARDE MUSIC AND THE SIXTIES 232, 241 (Robert Adlington ed., 2009). 
 50. See DERRIDA, supra note 48, at 87. 
 51. DERRIDA, supra note 48, at 82. 
 52. DERRIDA, supra note 48, at 87. 
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would put a stop to freedom of speech, freedom of the individual, the plurality 
of voices, the voicing of the unpopular, and the discomfiting demands of the 
articulate minority. In short, he would have no respect for democracy, for the 
condition of what makes his power, not his own power but the power of 
democratic office, possible. 
What is it that the state in the guise of its Donderos sees in the art of 
Advancing American Art when it calls for a ban on it? It sees representational 
space disfigured. However, the paintings in Advancing American Art de-figure 
representation, they displace the figure from representation. The de-figuring of 
representation opens up a space into which the one denied a place in 
representation can project herself, or in which she sees her own invisibility or 
in which her visibility is not being recognized. State power sees a defective or 
non-functioning public sphere, either because of the displacement of the figure 
within it, or because the representational definition of that sphere, in terms of 
the complimentary aesthetic values of harmony, balance, and proportion 
governing how to understand the space representing it, has been breached. 
When one hears talk of ‘values’ being represented in painting what does 
one see? Practices of morality, desired outcomes of freedom, achievements of 
the individual, the working of the collective – all of which, separately and 
together, must fit the frame of representation. Even in their disagreement these 
values must fit into that space; indeed without representation, without a space 
unified by the proper place of the figure as such, there could not be 
disagreement between them. Because it is on the body of the figure that their 
difference is measured. De-figuring that body reveals the powers acting on it, 
and the forces of which it is capable in resisting those powers. Should that 
space be shown to be dis-unified or incoherent, should that space be distorted 
by the presence of a figure that does not fit, then those values are unable 
properly to be represented, they have lost their allotted place in the order of the 
world. It is not about this or that political content, it is not whether what is 
represented is popular or advanced, it is about the condition of representation 
as such, the condition of possibility of there being content at all. 
Democracy too needs representational space. After all, it is the space of the 
election of representatives of the people. In de-figuring that space, art can de-
figure democracy. To this extent Dondero is right. However, art can also assist 
democracy in the chance given by the threat that it, democracy, makes 
possible. Art can both put democracy into question, and provide a glimpse of 
the democracy possible through the transformative effect of responding to that 
threat. Art can withdraw something from democracy’s representationalism. It 
can grant a space necessary in order not to be simply closed in by democracy. 
In order to pose questions about democracy something must be withdrawn 
from it. Democracy is the most open political paradigm, but in order for it to be 
the most open it must wager on a withdrawal from it from within itself. 
Something of its openness must be withdrawn and opened elsewhere. Art 
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withdraws from democracy just such a space allowing us to question 
democracy. That space of art is itself democratic. Its democraticness is not co-
extensive with the democracy it is drawn from, but it is inseparable from it. 
IX. 
Let us for a moment consider a practice of aesthetics which has a bearing 
on the present discussion inasmuch as it reveals another understanding of art 
by the state: the communist state. Beginning in the 1960s, in response to the 
increased repression of their citizens exercised by the regimes of Warsaw Pact 
countries, the aesthetic became the field in which, in communist Eastern and 
Central Europe, a democratic individualism was most visible. Despite this, 
governmental authorities tolerated it and, to an extent, even encouraged it. It 
has been termed “resistance through aesthetics,”53 and can be situated between 
an act of resistance to the state through an individualistic political practice of 
aesthetic living, and a concession to the state in its lack of explicit address to 
the political in aesthetic works.54 
Letitia Guran characterizes it as a means by which to “survive and/or resist 
communism by cultivating cultural and aesthetic values as a modus vivendi,” 
which she names “aesthethics … [an] “ethics of culture, which in some of 
these cultures became an ethics of existence.”55 Martin Mircea argues that this 
aesthetics became “an implicit panaestheticism… tacitly installed over culture 
as a whole,” “supra-ordinary” because it did not face any resistance, despite, 
and one might say in virtue of, “annexing the intellectual debate as a whole.”56 
To give an account of its ambiguity under the rule of Ceaușescu in Communist 
Romania: 
 
 53. See generally Sorin Antohi, Commuting to Castalia: Noica’s ‘School,’ Culture and 
Power in Communist Romania, in GABRIEL LIICEANU, THE PĂLTINIȘ DIARY: A PAIDEIC MODEL 
IN HUMANIST CULTURE, vii–xxiv (James Christian Brown trans., Central European University 
Press 2000) (1983). Resistance through aesthetics is developed through the theory of ‘resistance 
through culture’ put forward by Constantin Noica and the ‘Păltiniș School’ he founded during 
Communism under the rule of Ceaușescu. Id. However, it should be noted that subsequent 
revelations contained in his Securitate files raise questions regarding Noica’s resistance. See the 
secret police files on Noica published in CONSTANTIN NOICA IN ARHIVA SECURITATII (Dura 
Mezdrea, ed., Bucharest: Humanitas 2009). See generally LIICEANU, supra, at xxv–xxii. 
 54. See generally Irina Culic, The Strategies of Intellectuals: Romania under Communist 
Rule in Comparative Perspective, in INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 43, 53–
59 (András Bozóki ed., 1999) (including additional explanation of resistance through aesthetics 
and referring the reader to the analysis by Katherine Verdery, Compromis i rezistelllii. Cultura 
romana sub Ceauescu [Compromise and resistance: Romanian culture under Ceauescu] 
(Bucharest: Humanitas, 1994)). 
 55. Letitia Guran, Aesthetics: A Modus Vivendi in Eastern Europe?, in IN MARX’S SHADOW: 
KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTELLECTUALS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA 53, 53, 55 
(Costica Bradatan & Serguei Alex Oushakine eds., 2010). 
 56. Id. at 66. 
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The aesthetic canon functioned as a relative counter-ideological power, as a 
tolerated, controlled alternative, and, in any case, as a replacement of the total 
freedom of expression … This aesthetic survived mainly due to its ambiguous 
status with respect to the guidelines of the Party, due to the writers’ 
compliance with the rules of the game, and, moreover, due to the protection 
coming directly from the people of the Party. This ambiguous status was the 
source of a certain social prestige of the aesthetic, which the communist 
system tried to use in its own interest, while also controlling it.57 
The argument for “aesthetics” being an act of resistance, in this case, rests on 
the claim that it creates a hidden space of dialogue within systems of 
repression, immunized from them by a willing suspension of overt political 
action. Its theorists, Constantin Noica and Gabriel Liiceanu – the ‘Păltiniş 
School’ – contend that its veracity lies not in the difference it might make in 
any present system of repression, for instance by taking part in ongoing 
historical events, but in its participation in something which exceeds that 
system, namely the history of culture.58 It is as if suspension from political 
action understood in terms of exercising democratic rights grants entry into a 
democracy to come in which works produced in yet kept from the present 
moment are only then accorded their rightful place. It is as if the aesthetic of 
the Păltiniş School reserves the right not to say anything in the present moment 
as a way of saying something addressed to a people to come made free by this 
un-free inheritance. Can we grant that this not-saying is rather a saying under 
the condition of the impossibility of saying anything freely? Can the condition 
of the impossibility of free speech become the condition of possibility of 
another kind of aesthetic space? 
On the one hand, the suspension of the political is impossible where the 
political has been voided by the state. On the other, if suspension of the 
political can be achieved in the field of art displaced onto the everyday, then 
the aesthetic becomes an appropriation not of the space of politics, but of the 
act of its negation. The negation is then lived out positively in terms of an 
apolitical and politically powerless discourse among individuals made free by 
their separation from the political. To critique it as a “symptom of a less than 
heroic mentality,” as Guran does, is to presuppose that political resistance is 
otherwise possible in a field of action in which the space of politics as such has 
been negated.59 The Păltiniş gesture reinstates an apolitical aesthetic as a 
symptom of a world in which the political has been voided. If the participants 
in this aesthetic field acted under the condition of the privation of the political, 
 
 57. Id. at 59. 
 58. Id. at 67. 
 59. Id. at 69. 
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could they nonetheless be said to have reinstated democracy through the 
freedom with which they acted?60 
If the state could tolerate such aesthetics of living, it is because it 
understood the politics of art representationally, that is in terms of explicit 
political content. Under the condition of the rule of representation, a form of 
art in the guise of an apolitical everyday could not possibly be seen to be either 
political, or an act of resistance. It would be perceived by the state in the same 
way that the state sees every other expression of its people, as demos lacking 
kratos, without power. But for artists or thinkers to enact democracy under the 
condition of the privation of power, as a democratic individualism, is a practice 
displacing the internal border of democracy, the border between demos and 
kratos, in a manner which is invisible to the communist state, because the state 
configures public space as nothing but publicly visible, and immediately 
representable in its completeness. Thus is the same presupposition shared by 
Dondero and his enemies. 
X. 
Another way of thinking the paradox of democracy is given us by Jacques 
Rancière, and it is one that is both consonant and dissonant with Derrida’s. For 
Rancière, in his recent book Dissensus, the institution of democracy appears to 
answer the question of what it is that grounds the power of rule, but the answer 
it provides is that there is no ground at all.61 Democracy is not a form of 
government, it is a political supplement. It is the political which is 
supplementary to any particular form that a group of people qualified to govern 
might take, that which is superadded to whatever would qualify any one group 
of persons to govern. However, in being so added it at once both legitimizes 
and de-legitimizes any one set of people. For what is added is the will of the 
people. And government by the people for the people will lead to the 
disruption of the principles and procedures of whatever qualifies persons to 
govern. The will of the people will always be in excess of any political activity 
in one of two ways – self-governance is utopian, and individual desire is 
anarchic. Good governance will always require the reduction of this double 
excess of the will. Rancière summarizes this double bind of the democratic 
paradox thus, “Democracy as a form of government is threatened by 
democracy as a form of social and political life and so the former must repress 
the latter.”62 
 
 60. In private correspondence about the present essay, Guran argues that the resistance of the 
Păltiniş School was “more than an act of personal salvation,” in that it sought to preserve 
democratic values. 
 61. JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISSENSUS: ON POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 50 (Steven Corcoran 
ed. & trans., 2010). 
 62. Id. at 47. 
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Democracy is, in fact, neither of these for Rancière. Rather, democracy is 
the “institution of politics as such.”63 It is the supplement which makes power 
political, the inner difference that both legitimizes and de-legitimizes state 
institutions and practices of ruling.64 
The power of the people founds any rule, and at the same time withdraws 
its foundations. Democracy then is always vanishing, and forever in need of 
being retrieved. 
We can see then that both Derrida’s and Rancière’s accounts of democracy 
construe democracy as a paradox, where democracy is something like both the 
condition of possibility and impossibility of politics, where democracy both 
calls for and defers the rule of law. The difference between them is this: for 
Derrida, to be democratic means to act in the recognition that we never live in 
a (sufficiently) democratic society.65 Rancière’s worry would be that this 
translates into an ethical task rather than a political one. 
This helps us understand the problem we are faced with, above, when 
considering the “resistance through aesthetics” of the Păltiniş School; rather 
than a political resistance, their actions could be seen to reduce to an ethical 
choice, a private action measured against a transcendental horizon, at the 
expense of a visible action “here,” “now”; or a confusion of the political with 
the social, where there is nothing future at stake beyond a concern merely with 
the one’s immediate desires. The counter-argument to that would contend that 
the democratic individualism of retreating from the political sphere is invisible 
only to the authorities for whom representational space is the sole field of 
visibility; and that the gesture of such withdrawal keeps from the state 
something about its regime that enables the artist to democratize a space within 
it in order that it be put into question. 
Both Rancière and Derrida would agree on this aspect of the logic of 
democracy: that it consists in displacing the borders of the political, both the 
borders of its practice, and the borders of the concept. The practice of 
democracy is the putting into question where the borders of democracy lie, in 
the name of someone or something – a minority in the throes of articulating 
itself to democracy – calling for its democratic rights, demanding the power 
[kratos] to participate in the people [demos] when it has no basis upon which 
to ground that demand or power to do so, beyond the force of democracy; or in 
the name of someone or something – an artist resisting the power of 
democracy, whether that be the power of the people or the power of the state – 
proposing another possibility of kratos in which a hitherto unseen demos 
becomes felt. 
 
 63. Id. at 50. 
 64. Id. at 53–54. 
 65. JACQUES DERRIDA, PAPER MACHINE 140 (Rachel Bowlby trans., Stanford University 
Press 2005) (2001). 
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If Rancière is right and democracy is the name for politics, then that name 
means movement across borders, for there would be no politics without 
confrontation at the borders of the self and its freedom, without the encounter 
of the sovereignty of a people with the rights of an individual. Those borders 
take place in democracy, and this is the supplement that the aesthetic is for 
democracy, for it is with the practice of art that spaces otherwise invisible 
within democracy can be visibilised and opened up as possibilities for those 
who have yet to come to democracy. By visibilised I mean bring about a space 
other than representational space. Art assists us in understanding that the 
contestation over the meaning of the word democracy – which contestation 
takes place as the putting into practice of that meaning in such a way that it 
stands as a challenge to the fixity of the borders of democracy – is endless, and 
the meaning arrived endlessly perfectible, and never final. 
Art is always at odds with democracy, with any present democratic system, 
not just because it calls for the perfecting of whatever form of democracy 
prevails – democracy itself does this, it is its force – but because it is the 
outside of democracy in democracy, calling for the breaking through of the 
borders of democracy, precisely in the manner politicians have always 
stumbled upon. What politicians find intolerable about art is not its strength to 
effect change in any political system, but its weakness, its uselessness with 
respect to the exigency of political action. The force of art is precisely the 
showing that weakness is strength, that the weak become strong in the equality 
of democracy, because its powerlessness can resist strength. What art can do in 
its democratic spaces is perform how the weak can attain strength from 
possibilities hitherto denied them, for instance the possibility of gaining that 
which they anyway have: equality. 
When the AAPL sought to censor art “not indigenous to our soil,”66 they 
wanted to root power to soil, or presumed that power is so rooted, to the soil of 
America, and to make of that soil the ground of art and of what art makes 
possible – and impossible. As if democracy can be territorialized, the other 
side of the question we are rehearsing here, whether and if so how democracy 
can be translated, or carried (or spoken [phrasis]), over the border to 
somewhere other than here, other than from where one begins or from where 
one speaks. My answer to this is that there would not be democracy ‘here’ had 
it not already translated ‘there’; or, to put it another way, there is no democracy 
here until it has been returned by the other by whom it has been translated, 
whether that ‘other’ be on the other side of a geographical or geo-political 
border, or the other side of a border of democracy internal to democracy.67 
 
 66. Ausfeld, supra note 1, at 17; BARNHISEL, supra note 13, at 61; KRENN, supra note 9, at 
36. 
 67. Is this to say that there is no democracy in the U.S. unless and until it has been translated 
elsewhere – say, for instance, in Iraq? In a specific sense yes it is to say this. There was the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
322 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:303 
 
attempt to enforce democracy in Iraq, in what one might say was the name of democracy, but in 
at least arguably an anti-democratic way. But democracy enforced is not the same thing as the 
force of democracy. The force of democracy will emerge as a consequence of the play between 
the powers marshaled in the attempt to enforce democracy in Iraq, and the power expressed in the 
violent and powerful reactions against it and the ways in which certain parties and interests 
attempted to take advantage of the openings created by the invasion, no less by political 
opposition to it in the ‘democratic west’ than by religious resistance to it in the region. America 
will not have been the democracy that it is until it responds to itself, until the debate about its 
actions and the critical discussion of its reasons or other motivations has ensued: whether it was 
the right thing to invade Iraq or not, how it could have been done differently, in what way 
democracy could have been better served if more thought had been given to what happens after 
the success or otherwise of the invasion, and so on. Or in other words, not until it has engaged in 
democratic response to the question of whether it was democratic. America’s on-going 
perfectibility as a democracy is contingent on whether and if so how that debate is conducted. 
